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We propose that networks of cooperation and allocation of social status
co-emerge in human groups. We substantiate this hypothesis with one of
the first longitudinal studies of cooperation in a preindustrial society, span-
ning 8 years. Using longitudinal social network analysis of cooperation
among men, we find large effects of kinship, reciprocity and transitivity in
the nomination of cooperation partners over time. Independent of these
effects, we show that (i) higher-status individuals gain more cooperation
partners, and (ii) individuals gain status by cooperating with individuals
of higher status than themselves. We posit that human hierarchies are
more egalitarian relative to other primates species, owing in part to greater
interdependence between cooperation and status hierarchy.1. Introduction
Humansgivemore generouslywhenobservedbyothers [1,2]. Evolutionaryexpla-
nations for the appeal of such conspicuous generosity include costly signalling [3],
indirect reciprocity [4], reputation-based partner choice [5] and service-for-pres-
tige [6,7]. According to these models, a reputation for generosity results in
group-wide favouritism in subsequent exchange, advantageous alliances, politi-
cal influence or mating opportunities. In more general terms, building a
reputation for greater ability and willingness to benefit others (i.e. prestige)
grants greater access to contested material and social resources (i.e. social
status). Prestige has greater social currency in humans relative to other apes
[8,9], forwhoman ability andwillingness to inflict costs on others (i.e. dominance)
tends to be a stronger determinant of status [10]. Humans evolved greater interde-
pendence, relying on each other for learning skills, producing food, engaging in
mutual defence and raising offspring [11]. Individuals who can offer unique ser-
vices in these contextsmay receive deference or are preferred cooperation partners
andmates [12]. Humans also evolved the cognitive abilities to createweapons and
form large levelling coalitions that could check would-be dominants [13].
Field studies provide suggestive evidence that status accrues to those who
build prestige via cooperation: individuals who receive more social support
or wield more informal political influence are often generous food producers
[14–20], sharers of valued information [21,22] or generous contributors to collec-
tive action [23–26]. However, these field studies are cross-sectional, so they lack
tests of dynamics and their interpretation is subject to potential endogeneity or
reverse causality issues [27]. Indeed, cooperation is as likely to be a consequence
as to be a cause of status differences, for at least four reasons. First, greater access to
contested resources enhances individuals’ ability to build prestige and increase
their social following via cooperation. This is especially likely given the ‘Matthew
effect’, whereby high-status individuals are evaluated more favourably or
(a) (b)
Figure 1. (a) Two Tsimane men returning from a hunt; (b) Tsimane man helping resolve a dispute over land, which is illustrative of the largely informal way in
which political influence operates in this society. Photo credits: Chris von Rueden. (Online version in colour.)
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2experience other advantages owing to their status [28]. Status
can be self-reinforcing. Second, the status may motivate contin-
ued generosity, in order to signal that one’s status is justified or
one’s leadership is trustworthy [29]. Such generosity on the part
of high-status individuals may become normative, i.e. ‘noblesse
oblige’ [30]. Third, cooperation by high-status individuals may
motivate cooperation by other group members, owing to pres-
tige-biased imitation [31,32]. Fourth, by forming cooperative
partnershipswith high-status individuals, groupmembers elev-
ate their own status by gaining access to high-status individuals’
information [10], resources or coalitions.
Thus, cooperation between individuals may be driven by
opportunities to acquire status, and the distribution of status
within a group can affect how and with whom individuals
choose to cooperate. We contend that the emergence of
cooperation in human groups is influenced by status hierarchy,
just as the emergenceof the human status hierarchy is shapedby
opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. We further
posit that human hierarchies (at least in many small-scale
societies) may be more egalitarian relative to the hierarchies of
other primate species [12,13], owing in part to greater depen-
dence of status on cooperation. There is a market-like
competition between higher-status individuals, and also
between those low in status, with high-status individuals
aiming to increase or maintain their followership via
cooperation and those low in status seeking high-status
cooperation partners to improve their own status. By contrast,
high-ranking non-human primates are less likely to cooperate
with lower-ranking individuals (in terms of grooming or food
sharing), particularly in species where status is not heavily
dependent on coalition formation [33,34].
We derive two predictions from the foregoing theory,
which we test in a small-scale human society using longitudi-
nal social network analysis: (i) higher-status individuals will
be more frequently nominated as a cooperation partner, and
(ii) over time, individuals increase their social status by coop-
erating with higher-status individuals. The first prediction
reflects a process of network selection (tie formation) while
the second prediction reflects a process of network influence
(ties affect individuals’ attributes). Both our predictions
depart from models of the evolution of cooperation that
rely on network selection but between similar behavioural
types [35,36]. Instead, we posit tie formation predominantly
between individuals of initially different statuses and, in
turn, similarity of connected individuals resulting more
from network influence than from network selection.Tests of these predictions use longitudinal data spanning
8 years, collected among Tsimane forager-horticulturalists in
Amazonian Bolivia. The Tsimane are relatively egalitarian,
but men ostensibly wield more informal political influence
thanwomen, in part owing to a division of labour that typically
constrains women’s networking beyond the extended house-
hold [37]. For this study, we focused our attention on men.
We collected threewaves of panel data on all men in one village
(aged 21 years and older, ave. n = 80). Wave 1 of the data was
collected in 2009, wave 2 in 2014 and wave 3 in 2017. At each
wave, men listed other adult men who shared food with
them or assisted them in hunting, fishing or horticultural
labour over the previous six months (figure 1a). Roughly two
weeks later, a sample of these men photo-ranked all other
adult men on two measures of status: who is respected
and who has influence during village meetings (figure 1b).
We combined these photo-ranked status measures into a
single variable (status), as suggested by amaximum-likelihood
factor analysis (electronic supplementary material). Peer-
ratings can be an efficient and accurate method for producing
quantitative data from local knowledge [38,39], especially for
a public, positional good-like status. Furthermore, studies of
the Tsimane and other small-scale societies find that peer-
rated status correlates strongly with observational measures
of status [37,40].
Our analytical approach is stochastic actor-orientedmodel-
ling (SAOMs) [41]. SAOMs estimate the node-level (actor),
dyad-level (partner) and network-level (group) mechanisms
that are associated with a change in network ties and in
dependent attributes (behaviours) of actors (see the electronic
supplementary material, table S3 for a description of specified
effects in our model). To test our predictions, status is analysed
in association with change in network ties and concurrently
assessed as a dependent ‘behaviour’. Our analysis was necess-
arily restricted to those men present in at least two time waves
(ave. n = 68). As a reliability check, we includemen’s status in a
cross-sectional analysis of the cooperation network in another
Tsimane community (n = 89).2. Results
Note that all in-degree parameters in our model capture the
tendency for an individual to be nominated as a cooperation
partner. Out-degree parameters indicate whether an individ-
ual is more likely to nominate others as cooperating with
Table 1. Estimated effects of network structure and covariates on cooperation network dynamics and status dynamics, from a network-behaviour coevolutionary
stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM). n = 60 at T1 (2009), 74 at T2 (2014), 70 at T3 (2017).
parameter β s.e p OR (CI)
cooperation network dynamics
cooperation rate (period 1) 35.12 8.56 <0.001 —
cooperation rate (period 2) 11.51 1.28 <0.001 —
out-degree (density) 0.58 0.46 0.211 1.78 (0.72, 4.39)
reciprocity 1.52 0.12 <0.001 4.59 (3.60, 5.85)
tendency towards transitivitya 1.43 0.10 <0.001 4.17 (3.46, 5.03)
in-degree popularity (sqrt) −0.54 0.11 <0.001 0.58 (0.47, 0.72)
out-degree activity (sqrt) −0.57 0.12 <0.001 0.57 (0.45, 0.72)
main effect of kinship 0.59 0.10 <0.001 1.81 (1.48, 2.20)
status in-degree 0.06 0.03 0.038 1.06 (1.00, 1.13)
status out-degree 0.11 0.05 0.013 1.12 (1.02, 1.22)
status similarity 0.31 0.22 0.164 1.36 (0.88, 2.08)
strength and size in-degree 0.18 0.06 0.003 1.20 (1.06, 1.36)
strength and size out-degree −0.04 0.08 0.611 0.96 (0.82, 1.12)
strength and size similarity 0.35 0.23 0.131 1.42 (0.90, 2.22)
income in-degree −0.02 0.02 0.362 0.98 (0.95, 1.02)
income out-degree −0.01 0.02 0.812 0.99 (0.95, 1.04)
income similarity 0.25 0.16 0.112 1.28 (0.94, 1.74)
log age in-degree 0.02 0.33 0.961 1.02 (0.53, 1.95)
log age out-degree −3.81 0.67 <0.001 0.02 (0.01, 0.08)
log age similarity −0.53 0.24 0.029 0.59 (0.36, 0.95)
status dynamics
status rate (period 1) 7.60 1.96 <0.001 —
status rate (period 2) 6.62 1.76 <0.001 —
status linear shape −0.01 0.07 0.9 0.99 (0.86, 1.14)
status quadratic shape −0.03 0.02 0.114 0.97 (0.93, 1.01)
status average alter 0.19 0.09 0.037 1.20 (1.01, 1.43)
strength and size 0.17 0.08 0.037 1.19 (1.01, 1.40)
income 0.06 0.02 0.008 1.06 (1.02, 1.11)
log age 0.90 0.46 0.048 2.46 (1.01, 5.99)
aTendency towards transitivity was measured using the geometrically weighted shared edgewise partners effect (GWESP), where α = 0.69. For further
elaboration of the effect, see the electronic supplementary material.
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3him. This departs from the usual terms used within the
cooperation literature, with in-degree and out-degree being
applied to the direction of the flow of aid, not the direction of
actor nominations. However, our approach is synonymous
with other studies employing SAOMs, where measurement
of cooperation captures an actor’s perception of their coopera-
tive relationships and the underlying events that comprise such
relationships (e.g. the actual food transfers/aid in production)
are latent/unobserved. See table 1 for the effects of all
parameters in our SAOM.
(a) Within-network effects on cooperation dynamics
There was a substantial rate of change in cooperation ties
throughout the study. Changes peaked between waves 1 and
2 (see rate parameters in table 1). Over time, nominations of co-
operation were likely to be reciprocated (odds ratio (OR) = 4.59,confidence interval (CI) = (3.60, 5.85)). Our results further indi-
cate that individuals were more likely to form transitive groups
of cooperators (OR = 4.17, CI = (3.46, 5.03)). This suggests that if
individual i nominated individual j and individual j nominates
individual h, then the odds of individual i subsequently nomi-
nating individual h as a cooperator increased. In-degree
popularity (OR = 0.58, CI = (0.47, 0.72)) and out-degree activity
(OR = 0.57, CI = (0.45, 0.72)) decreased the odds of ties forming.
In other words, those receiving many nominations as a
cooperation partner, and individuals nominating many others
as cooperation partners, were 42% and 43% less likely to receive
or provide nominations (respectively) in a later period.
(b) Actor covariate effects on cooperation dynamics
Being close kin increased the odds of cooperation partnerships
forming (OR= 1.81, CI = (1.48, 2.20)). Being physically stronger
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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4and larger increased the odds of being nominated as a
cooperation partner (OR= 1.20, CI = (1.06, 1.36)), but there
was no substantial association between physical strength and
size and the odds of out-degree nominations, nor was there a
meaningful tendency for cooperation partnerships to form
between individuals similar in physical strength and size.
There was no considerable association between income and
the odds of sending or receiving cooperation nominations,
nor did individuals of similar income tend to prefer each
other as cooperation partners. Results further suggest that log
age had no considerable association with the odds of receiving
nominations as a cooperation partner, but being older tended
to decrease the odds of naming others as cooperation partners
(OR= 0.02, CI = (0.01, 0.08)). Cooperation partnerships were
41% less likely to form between individuals of a similar age
(OR= 0.59, CI = (0.36, 0.95)). In otherwords, the results suggest
a tendency for individuals to form cooperation partnerships
with peers dissimilar to themselves in age.
(c) The effects of status on cooperation dynamics
We found support for our first prediction: status increased the
odds of being nominated as a cooperation partner (OR= 1.06,
CI = (1.00, 1.13)). Status also increased the odds of naming
others as cooperation partners (OR = 1.12, CI = (1.02, 1.22)).
There was no meaningful tendency towards selection-based
homophily according to status; thus, status similarity was not
associated with the odds of cooperation partnerships forming.
Overall, our results suggest that higher status associates with
both nominating and being nominated as a cooperation partner.
Cross-sectional analysis of Tsimane men’s cooperation net-
work in another community, using exponential random graph
modelling (ERGM), is generally consistent with our longitudi-
nal results (electronic supplementary material, table S8). Status
again increased the odds of being nominated as a cooperation
partner (OR= 1.05, CI = (1.01, 1.09)). However, status in this
second community decreased the odds of nominating
others as cooperation partners (OR= 0.95, CI = (0.92, 0.99)).
See the electronic supplementary material for details.
(d) The effects of cooperation on status dynamics
As shown in table 1, there was a substantial amount of change
in men’s status over time, with a change in status in period 1
being relatively similar to change in status in period 2. The
insignificant shape effects indicate that status was not self-rein-
forcing. If anything, there is a weak tendency for status to
regress to the mean. In addition to the shape effects, we find
support for our second prediction. The average alter effect indi-
cated that the average status of the individuals with whom an
actor cooperates increased the odds of an individual’s status
ascending (OR= 1.20, CI = (1.01, 1.43)). In other words, our
results indicate that an individual’s status tended to rise to
become similar to that of their cooperation partners through
a process of network influence. The average alter effect is not
directed so it accounts for both in-degree and out-degree ties.
The effect was relatively unchanged if we instead specified
an average in alter effect (average status of individuals
who nominate the focal actor as a cooperation partner), a
total alter effect (the summed statuses of an individual’s
cooperation partners) or a total in alter effect (summed statuses
of individuals who nominate the focal actor as a coopera-
tion partner). See the electronic supplementary material for
these additional models. Being physically stronger and larger(OR = 1.19, CI = (1.01, 1.40)), income (OR= 1.06, CI = (1.02,
1.11)) and log age (OR = 2.46, CI = (1.01, 5.99)) were also
independently associated with increased status over time.3. Discussion
Using a novel social network approach, we provide, to our
knowledge, the first longitudinal evidence in a small-scale
human society that inter-individual differences in men’s
status associate with the formation of cooperation partner-
ships, and that changes in a man’s status associate with the
statuses of his cooperation partners. However, these status-
related effects were not large, relative to other predictors of
cooperation partnerships, including kinship and network reci-
procity. The latter is the tendency for an individual to nominate
a cooperation partner who had previously nominated him but
is not necessarily evidence of a strategy of reciprocity on the
part of individuals. The relative magnitudes of status, kinship
and network reciprocity effects within our study bear a simi-
larity to the results of cross-sectional network analyses of
cooperation in other small-scale societies. Within each of
these other studies [19,20,42–45], status or income had smaller
effects on cooperation compared to kinship andmetrics of reci-
procity. The cross-cultural similarity in how much status
matters compared to kinship and reciprocity suggest some
commonality in the formation of cooperation networks,
despite large differences in network density (less than 0.01–
0.39) and average degree (3.4–13.1) across studies.
We also find a tendency for cooperation partners to form
transitive groups. While the transitive nominations of
cooperation in our study do not explicitly capture transitive
flows of aid, our result is consistent with a preference by Tsi-
mane men to extend cooperation to their cooperation partners’
cooperation partners. Recent evidence from longitudinal
social network analysis has highlighted that the importance of
transitivity is equivalent to that of network reciprocity for
the formation of cooperation networks, i.e. friendships [46].
Whether transitivity in social networks in part reflects a
cooperation strategy independent of reciprocity requires further
theoretical inquiry. The present findings highlight the need
for future research to consider transitive group formation, in
both empirical investigation and theoretical modelling of the
evolution of cooperation.
Among the Tsimane, men who are respected and influen-
tial in community decision-making (i.e. high in status) were
more likely to be nominated over time as sharing food or assist-
ing in hunting, fishing or horticultural labour. This result
replicated in a cross-sectional analysis of Tsimane men in a
second community. One explanation of these results is that
higher-status Tsimane men may be more likely to share food
and seek out cooperation opportunities with diverse commu-
nity members. Political influence may hinge on maintaining
coalitional support via generosity [16] and widespread social
networking. Previous work with the Tsimane highlighted
that politically influential men have reputations for generosity,
and the association between a reputation for generosity and
political influence appeared to be largely mediated by men’s
coalitional support [17]. But why seek respect or political influ-
ence in this relatively egalitarian context? Immediate benefits
include resolving conflicts or steering community debates in
directions that, while favourable to the community, are particu-
larly favourable to oneself or family members. Among the
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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5Tsimane, these debates often concern interactions with outside
groups and conflicts over arable land, sexual jealousy, adultery,
theft and other conflicts. Longer-term benefits may include
lower chronic stress [47] and reproductive gains within and
outside marital unions [48], which may be owing to enhanced
mate value and greater social support for one’s family during
periods of particular need, such as illness [14,15].
Higher-status individuals may also be desirable as
cooperation partners. Higher status among Tsimane men (in
the longitudinal but not cross-sectional analysis) was associ-
ated with reports of receiving cooperation from others, and
we further find that having higher-status cooperation partners
was associated with an increase in an individual’s status over
time. The gain in status from cooperation with higher-status
group members does not appear to be driven by a man’s
cooperativeness in general: the average status of a man’s
cooperation partners had a similar effect as his partners’
summed statuses. The acquisition of social status may
thus at least partly be a function of social connectedness to
high-status group members.
A number of theoretical possibilities are consistent
with status increasing as a result of cooperation with higher-
status individuals. Lower-status individuals may gain access
to information [10], resources or coalitional support that may
increase their own status. Also, if high-status individuals are
foci of social attention within their community, cooperation
with high-status individuals may more effectively broadcast
prosociality or other desirable attributes to other community
members. A previous study of adults in an industrialized
society found that individuals are more generous with better-
connected members of their social network [49]. Individuals
who engage in cooperation with higher status others may
also mimic their prosocial behaviours [31], whichmay increase
similarity in prestige and thus in status.
The associations between status and cooperation are inde-
pendent of the associations between cooperation and other
attributes of Tsimane men, including their age, income and
physical strength and size. In the longitudinal analysis, older
age was associated with fewer nominations of cooperation
partners, which may reflect the increasing concentration of
cooperation among close neighbours as older men’s pro-
ductivity and mobility wane. Strength and size associate with
political influence in the Tsimane [17], which may be owing
to their contribution to leader charisma [50] and coordination
ability [51]. Indeed, strength and size in the present analysis
associated with increases in status over time. However, phys-
ical strength and size also related to the acquisition of
cooperation partners independent of Tsimane men’s status,
perhaps because physical formidability is desirous in an ally
in the event of conflict. Strength and size may also associate
with production skill, as may also be the case for hunting
ability in other small-scale societies [52].
Because we only assessed men, no conclusions can be
made about cooperation among women or between the
sexes. Previous research among the Tsimane suggests that net-
works of cooperation differ in their structure across the sexes
[37,53], in part owing to a sexual division of labour. Thus,
future work should not simply analyse both sexes within a
single network but consider the interaction and association
of individuals within and across networks, which may
inform men’s and women’s cooperation decisions.
In general, the present findings suggest that models of the
evolution of cooperation should consider (i) the networkedstructure of human cooperation as well as (ii) the relative
status of cooperators. Our findings do not exclude other
mechanisms by which status hierarchy and cooperation cata-
lyse each other. The opportunity to gain prestige may
incentivize individuals to absorb costs of leadership during
collective action [6,7]. For example, prior work with the
Tsimane suggests that leader–follower relationships may
help resolve collective action problems, particularly when
leaders have traits that lower the costs and increase the
efficacy of coordinating and enforcing cooperation [25,51].
Our findings further highlight the importance of longitudi-
nal design for understanding processes of homophily in
networks [54]. While mathematical models have suggested
that cooperation is sustained when individuals selectively
assort with those who display similarity in cooperativeness
[55], the methodological paradigms used in field studies and
experiments often cannot parse effects of network selection
and network influence on actor similarity. Social ties may influ-
ence cooperation independent of tie selection: cooperation can
increase or decrease via social influence [56]. Indeed, a longitudi-
nal study of Hadza foragers suggests that cooperators assort
within camps, owing to a process that may be more similar to
network influence than network selection [57,58]. By using
SAOMs, our study provides an important methodological con-
tribution to the extant literature, highlighting an analytical
strategy that can parse network selection and network influence.
We speculate on the implications of the present findings
for the evolution of human status hierarchy, particularly the
political egalitarianism characteristic of many small-scale
societies. A prominent explanation of human egalitarianism,
supported by ethnographic observation [59] and analytical
modelling [60], suggests that egalitarianism emerged as
humans evolved the cognitive abilities to form coalitions of
sufficient size, efficacy and duration to check would-be domi-
nants. In addition, egalitarianism may have been enabled by
the evolution of greater interdependence among members of
human groups, particularly in food production, group defence
and raising of offspring [11]. Individualswho can supply valu-
able information or services in these contexts may receive
deference [10] and be preferred as cooperation partners and
mates [12], whereas pursuing dominance over others may
risk losing cooperation partners essential to survival and
reproduction. Furthermore, the transfer of information and
resources from higher to lower-status individuals, as well as
the potential reputational benefits to cooperating with
higher-status individuals, may constrain or even erode status
differentials. Analytic modelling suggests that status inequal-
ity is constrained when by cooperating, status-dissimilar
individuals influence each other’s statuses [61]. This process
may counter the otherwise self-reinforcing nature of status
(i.e. the ‘Matthew effect’), whereby access to contested
resources begets more status or is used to prevent others
from acquiring status. In our longitudinal study in a Tsimane
community, we find that individuals gain status the greater the
status of their cooperation partners. This network influence
effect is relatively independent of our estimation of general
change in status in the community, which if anything shows
a slight regression to the mean status over time. These results
are consistent with the relative political egalitarianism we
observe in Tsimane communities and with network influence
playing a role in such egalitarianism. However, determining
whether cooperation between status-dissimilar individuals is
actually constraining increases in status inequality will require
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2. The cooperation network over time, restricted to men present in at least two time waves. (a) 2009 (n = 60; ave. degree = 7.80; density = 0.087); (b) 2014
(n = 74; ave. degree = 3.39; density = 0.044); (c) 2017 (n = 70; ave. degree = 6.02; density = 0.072). Node size indicates the number of in-degree nominations an
individual received for sharing food or assisting in hunting, fishing or horticultural labour. Node colour indicates the individual’s status, such that darker colours
reflect higher status. Arrows indicate the directionality of ties, i.e. incoming arrows indicate receipt of cooperation nominations. The digraphs were made in
R package igraph [67]. The network at time wave 2 shows reduced density, which may correspond with the catastrophic flooding and crop loss that occurred
that year. Men may have further concentrated cooperation with relatives, owing to mobility constraints or insufficient food to share widely. (Online version in colour.)
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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6a more fine-grained study of how status change is distributed
across the hierarchy.
Within and across human societies, socio-ecological
variation in the sexual division of labour, subsistence strategies,
mobility, community size and density, access tomaterialwealth
and other factors should pattern cooperation, status hierarchy
and their dynamic interaction. For example, greater status
inequality in societies with more material wealth may result
in part from reduced cooperation between the wealthy and
non-wealthy [62], which decreases the opportunity for lower-
status individuals to gain status via network influence.
Analytical models indicate that restricting connectivity in
social networks can increase hierarchy [63,64]. Also, access
tomaterialwealth canmake cooperationmore overtly competi-
tive or self-aggrandizing. In chiefdoms and Big Man societies,
status often depended on sponsoring lavish feasts or gift
exchanges, not only to signal personal qualities but also to gen-
erate indebtedness and reveal others’ weaknesses [65]. The
present study of the Tsimane provides a fruitful platform
for future longitudinal studies in other societies, to further
determine how particular cultural and ecological factors con-
tribute to the relationship between cooperation and social
status, and to infer the evolution of that relationship over
human history.4. Material and methods
(a) Ethnographic setting
The Tsimane live in small villages in the neotropics of central, low-
land Bolivia. Their economy is based on swidden horticulture
(plantains, manioc, rice and corn), hunting, fishing and fruit gath-
ering. Food sharing and collaboration in productive activities tend
to be concentratedwithin extended families residing in the same or
nearby households [66]. Women do the large majority of direct
childcare and food processing. The Tsimane have no documented
history of inter-villagewarfare.Within villages, conflicts tend to be
resolved by the parties directly involved. For many of the conflicts
that remain unresolved, third partieswithin the extended family or
in the villagemay step in to helpmediate. Villagers also holdmeet-
ings to respond to incursion by illegal loggers or other colonists,
negotiate with itinerant merchants or coordinate projects with
the Bolivian government or non-governmental organizations.The Tsimane remained largely unconnected to Bolivian society
until the mid-twentieth century, when a new wave of missionaries
and a road from the highlands arrived. Average income is less than
$2 (US) per day from the sale of horticultural products and spora-
dic wage labour with loggers and ranchers.
(b) Data collection
Three waves of panel data, including status rankings and reported
cooperation partners, were collected from the entire adult male
population 21 years of age and above in one Tsimane village. Data
were collected in 2009 (n = 72), 2014 (n = 78) and 2017 (n = 89).
Growth in adult male population size was owing to immigration,
in addition to more boys entering adulthood than adult men
dying. A single wave of the panel data was collected in 2008 from
the adult men in another Tsimane village (n = 89).
(c) Cooperation networks
Networks of cooperation were constructed using a ‘name genera-
tor’ approach, with men freely listing other men within the village
who had shared food with them or assisted them in hunting, fish-
ing or horticultural labour over the previous sixmonths.Menwere
questioned about each domain of cooperation separately, and we
treated a nomination in any domain as a tie to the nominated indi-
vidual. Networks were sociocentric, binary and directed. While
Tsimane men’s cooperation in hunting and fishing often produces
shared rewards, we maintain nominations in these domains as
directed because hunting and fishing partners may differ in their
valuation of each other’s cooperation, or in the caloric gain from
cooperation [51]. For the longitudinal analysis, the population
was restricted to adult men (ave. n = 68) who were present
within the village in at least two waves of data collection
(figure 2a–c). The composition change observed in the networks
was modelled through the method of joiners and leavers [68].
(d) Social status
At each wave of data collection, approximately a third of the adult
men in the village were randomly selected to rank photos of other
men from their village. Photos were Polaroids™ of the top-half of
each man’s body, set against as neutral a background as possible.
Each ranker was presented two arrays of photos, one array at a
time, and asked to rank the men in each array from highest to
lowest (no ties allowed) according to ‘who is most respected’.
Each ranker also ranked two additional arrays of photos according
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rspb
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7to ‘whose voice carries the most weight during community
debates.’ Photos were numbered, and the photos chosen for a par-
ticular array corresponded to the row vectors in a matrix based on
a projective plane (see the electronic supplementary material for
more detail). Based on the matrix, each man’s photo was ranked
nine times, each time in an array with eight other photos to
whom he had not yet been compared. Thus, each man could
receive a status score ranging from 9 (lowest) to 81 (highest). This
procedure kept the number of arrays and photos per array to a
minimum, while ensuring every photo was compared to every
other photo only once. To fit the current requirements of the mod-
elling approach, the status rankings were transformed into ordinal
percentile rankings with 10 levels. Because of the larger number of
men, we used a larger matrix in 2014 and 2017, whereby each
man’s photo was ranked 10 times, in arrays with nine other
photos. The photo-ranked scores from 2014 and 2017 were trans-
formed to match the potential range in scores (9–81) from 2009
and in village 2.
Our confidence in the validity of the photo-ranking is strength-
ened by ethnographic observation. In the village assessed
longitudinally, influence ranking in 2009 predicted who spoke
more frequently during community meetings attended by
C.R.v.R. that year (r = 0.53, p < 0.001, n = 73). The same was true
for influence ranking and community meetings attended by
C.R.v.R. in 2014 (r = 0.67, p = 0.002, n = 49).(e) Covariates
All demographic data used to determine the age of individuals
and construct their kinship networks come from reproductive his-
tory interviews first collected from 2003 to 2005 and updated
annually thereafter. Individuals were analysed as close kin if
they were brothers or father and son (whether consanguineal or
in-law). This definition of kinship reflects the concentration of
Tsimane social life within clusters of households consisting of
siblings, their spouses, their parents and their children. At each
wave, household income was determined by asking men about
all potential sources of income over the past year, including
wage labour and sales of forest and horticultural goods. Income
was transformed into ordinal percentile rankings with 10 levels.
Every 1–3 years, clinicians employed with the Tsimane Health
and Life History Project (THLHP: http://www.unm.edu/~tsi-
mane) measured participants’ height and weight with a portable
stadiometer and a digital weigh scale, respectively. Shoulder and
chest strength were measured with a Lafayette Manual Muscle
Tester and grip strength was measured with a Smedley III dynam-
ometer. We summed these values to create a composite upper
body strength measure. A maximum-likelihood factor analysis
indicated that height, weight and upper body strength comprised
a distinct factor with adequate internal consistency. We standar-
dized and averaged these measures to assess them as a single
covariate that captures physical strength and size. Our models
use the log of men’s age as previous research has found that age
does not have a linear associationwith status [17] orwith food pro-
duction [66]. See the electronic supplementary material for
covariate descriptives and details of the factor analysis.( f ) Analytical strategy
The longitudinal analysis was conducted using SAOMs [41] using
RSIENA software (Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network
Analysis: RSIENA version 1.2-12 in R 3.5.2) [69]. SAOMs estimate
latent changes in a network, and changes in actors’ ‘behaviours’
within that network, between observed time points. These changes
aremodelled as a continuous-time process, and actors are assumed
to control their outgoing ties and the expression of ‘behaviours’ in a
succession of multiple small steps, termed ‘microsteps’ [41]. These
microsteps provide some statistical power for these complex
models [70]. SAOMs estimate the rate of opportunities for
change and further estimate the node-level (individual actor),
dyad-level and network-level mechanisms that may be driving
change using an evaluation function. A positive parameter esti-
mate would indicate that the parameter produced a preference
for creation and maintenance of a tie or an increase in a tie-depen-
dent ‘behaviour’. For the present analysis, a network-behaviour
coevolutionary SAOM was specified [71], in order to simul-
taneously assess the temporal relationships that cooperation
network dynamics (the dependent network) have with status
(the dependent ‘behaviour’). Several endogenous, structural net-
work tendencies and several theoretically relevant actor-attribute
effects—specifically those relating to kinship, log age, income
and physical strength and size—were controlled for within the
evaluation function. The groupmean of the actor covariates is sub-
tracted from each actor’s score; these centred scores allow for more
comparable estimates between covariates [69]. The model had
good convergence, with an overall maximum convergence t-ratio
of 0.13 and individual parameter t-ratios less than 0.10, and the
model controlled for some time-heterogeneity of effects [72]. See
the electronic supplementarymaterial for a briefmodel description
and further details on model specification.
For the cross-sectional network analysis, we used an ERGM.
See the electronic supplementary material for details.
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